Translated by ChatGPT, edited by Sinocism.com

Source: China Macroeconomic Forum / syndicated by Sina Finance | July 12–13, 2026

On July 11, the 122nd CMF Macroeconomic Hot Issues Seminar was held online. The theme of this session was “The Nature of This Round of K-Shaped Economic Divergence and Governance Strategies.” Li Daokui, dean of the Academic Center for Chinese Economic Practice and Thinking at Tsinghua University, attended and delivered a keynote presentation.

7月11日，CMF宏观经济热点问题研讨会（第122期）在线上举行，本次主题是“本轮经济K型分化的本质与治理策略”，清华大学中国经济思想与实践研究院院长李稻葵出席，并作主题分享。

The following are the main points of his remarks:

以下是演讲的主要内容：

My first core point is this: the biggest problem facing China’s macroeconomy today is not K-shaped divergence, but that the economy as a whole is running cold—and this has already persisted for three years. Why do I emphasize this? Because once we start talking about K-shaped divergence, it is as though we are placing our hopes on the upward arm of the K and expecting it to pull the entire Chinese economy forward. That actually leads us away from the real problem. I agree with the views just expressed by the other speakers, but the upper arm of the K cannot pull up the entire economic base. On this issue, we must maintain a strong sense of urgency.

我的第一个核心观点是：当前中国宏观经济最大的问题，不是K型分化，而是整体偏冷，而且这种偏冷已经持续了三年。为什么我强调这一点？因为一提K型分化，就好像我们把希望寄托在K型的上线，指望它来拉动整个中国经济，这其实把问题带偏了。刚才各位的观点我都同意，但上面那条线，是拉不动整个经济底座的。在这个问题上，我们必须有忧患意识。

The first figure is the broad unemployment rate. Based on the National Bureau of Statistics’ underlying data, we have added back in those people who, after failing to find work over the past two years, are no longer counted statistically as part of the labor force. We call them the “discouraged labor force.” They have not “lain flat”; they still want to find jobs. Counting them as unemployed and adding them back into both the numerator and denominator produces a broad unemployment rate of 10.2 percent. There are roughly 24 million long-term discouraged unemployed people, which is highly unfavorable for social stability.

第一个数字是广义失业率。我们基于统计局的基础数据，把过去两年因找不到工作、已被统计上不算劳动人口的那部分人重新纳入——我们称之为“受挫劳动人口”，他们并没有“躺平”，仍然想找工作。把他们作为失业人口，重新计入分子和分母，测算出的广义失业率目前达到10.2%。长期受挫的失业人口大约2400万，这对社会稳定非常不利。

The second figure is fixed-asset investment. From January through May this year, cumulative fixed-asset investment fell by 4.1 percent. Private investment and manufacturing investment both registered negative growth, while cumulative fixed-asset investment showed growth of only 0.4 percent. In the statistical history of the People’s Republic, negative fixed-asset investment growth occurred only twice, in 1961 and 1967. The intensity and duration of the current decline exceed previous historical extremes. These two developments must command our close attention. Unless they are addressed, all of China’s economic targets and tasks will face difficulties.

第二个数字是固定资产投资。今年1至5月，累计固定资产投资下降4.1%，民间投资、制造业投资都是负增长，固定资产投资累计仅0.4%的正增长。固定资产投资负增长，在建国以来的统计史上，只发生在1961年和1967年，而这次累计负增长的烈度和强度，是过去从未有过的。这两件事必须引起我们高度关注。如果不解决，中国经济各项目标任务都会面临困难。

Of course, having said this, I must stress that China’s economy has a bright future and great potential, and we are full of confidence in it. But the problems must be confronted directly.

当然，话讲到这儿，我必须强调：中国经济是光明的，有潜力的，我们对此充满信心。但问题必须直面。

If we agree with the assessment above—that an economy running excessively cold has already created relatively serious macroeconomic problems—then we must next analyze what has caused this three-year stretch of economic weakness, with growth running below the potential GDP growth rate.

如果大家同意上述判断——即整体经济过冷已带来比较严重的宏观经济运行问题——那么接下来就要分析，到底是什么因素导致这一轮连续三年的经济偏冷，即运行在潜在GDP增速之下。

I will first give my overall judgment, and then discuss the specific mechanism.

我首先给出总体判断，再讲具体机制。

The overall judgment is that new drivers of growth have not yet been created, while the old growth engines of recent decades have already faded. Over the past 20 years, China’s rapid economic expansion was driven primarily not by household consumption—whose share of GDP was roughly 35 to 38 percent, excluding services consumption—but by two major engines. The first was large-scale infrastructure investment, sustained for nearly two decades and arguably the largest infrastructure buildout in human economic history. The second was the broad upswing in real estate, which unquestionably exerted an enormous pull on the economy.